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Abstract 
We analyze the relationships among shocks, exchange rate regimes, and capital 
controls in relation to the probabilities of currency crises. Based on the theoretical model 
by Nakatani (2016, 2017a), we use panel data on 34 developing countries and apply a 
probit estimation. We find that both productivity shocks and country risk premium 
shocks trigger currency crises, whereas productivity shocks are important for severe 
currency crises. We also find that the effects of these shocks on the probability of a crisis 
are larger for floating exchange rate regimes and that capital controls mitigate the effects 
of productivity shocks in pegged regimes. 
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1 Introduction 
Preventing financial crises has become one of the top priorities of policymakers in many 
countries, especially in light of the recent global financial crisis. The most frequent type of 
financial crisis in modern history is a currency crisis. Many economists and scholars in academia, 
international financial institutions and central banks have analyzed the mechanisms of currency 
crises both theoretically and empirically. In theory, the main areas of focus were inconsistent 
macroeconomic policies, a self-fulfilling prophecy caused by the interaction between 
policymakers and investors, and financial frictions and regulations as causes of currency crises. On 
the empirical side, many policymakers attempted to establish Early Warning Indicators to predict a 
future potential crisis. 
However, despite the abundant theoretical and empirical literature, almost no literature has 
analyzed what types of shocks triggered currency crises. As we will discuss in greater detail in the 
literature review section, in most theories, it is assumed that a certain type of shock, such as a 
financial shock or a real shock, can lead to a currency crisis. For example, Nakatani (2016, 2017a) 
recently developed a model in which a productivity shock in the real sector and/or a shock to a 
country’s risk premium can lead to a currency crisis. Despite this theoretical background, the 
question of which types of shocks led to past currency crises is purely an empirical issue, which 
has thus far only been analyzed by Nakatani (2017b). Nakatani (2017b) analyzed the effects of 
both productivity shocks and risk premium shocks on exchange rate dynamics, but he did not 
analyze the effects on the probability of a crisis. For this reason, in this article, we are the first to 
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analyze the effects of financial and real shocks on the probability of a currency crisis using a probit 
estimation technique. 
We elucidate the currency crisis mechanism empirically from the perspectives of 
policymakers by asking and answering three key questions. First, the types of shocks that can 
increase the probability of a currency crisis and its severity are investigated. In other words, this is 
the first empirical paper that studies the effects of two (real and financial) shocks on crisis 
probability. It is important to study the types of shocks that trigger currency crises and increase the 
severity of the situation because such knowledge will have invaluable implications for economists 
and policymakers who formulate international macroeconomic policies to prevent such crises. If 
financial shocks are important triggering factors of the crises, policymakers need to concentrate on 
developing financial supervisions and macroprudential policies. In contrast, if productivity shocks 
appear to be more important, they need to focus more on macroeconomic and industrial policies 
(e.g., product market regulations, labor market reforms, etc.) that can influence the real side of the 
economy. This paper addresses the question empirically based on the theoretical currency crisis 
model developed by Nakatani (2014, 2016, 2017a), which has several advantages over other types 
of models, as we will elaborate later. Following this model, we focus on two types of shocks—real 
shocks and financial shocks—using the data and analytical framework developed by Nakatani 
(2017b). We aim to contribute to the existing literature through an analysis of the effects of these 
shocks on the probability of a currency crisis, which is necessary because exclusion of the shocks 
from the independent variables can generate an omitted variable bias on the estimated coefficients. 
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In terms of data and methodology, we use unbalanced annual panel data comprising 34 emerging 
market and developing countries, and we apply a panel probit model. Our results suggest that both 
productivity shocks in the real sector and shocks to a country’s risk premium in the financial 
markets affect the probability of a currency crisis occurring, while productivity shocks appear to 
be more important for severe currency crises.  
Next, we further investigate the relationship between exchange rate policies and 
shock-induced crisis probability. Policymakers have been keen to understand the effectiveness of 
policy instruments to combat currency crises. Most literature has analyzed the effects of monetary 
policy responses to currency crises. For instance, Nakatani (2017b) used panel data on developing 
countries and found that an increase in the policy interest rate is associated with an appreciation of 
the domestic currency. However, an interest rate defense is not the only policy tool that can be 
used to manage currency crises. If a shock triggers the currency crisis, different exchange rate 
policies can have different effects on a currency crisis. For example, if the country has a floating 
exchange rate regime, the exchange rate can fluctuate freely to respond to various shocks. 
Therefore, the floating exchange rate regime might be more prone to experience large currency 
fluctuations and hence to experience a currency crisis as the nominal exchange rate responds 
quickly to the real shocks. In this context, this paper also studies how different exchange rate 
policies have different shock effects on the probability of a crisis. Thus, the second question is, 
“Does each shock have a different probability of a currency crisis if the country has a different 
exchange rate policy?” Our results show that the effects of these shocks are larger for floating 
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exchange rate regimes than for pegged ones. This might be a potential explanation for why some 
empirical studies have found that floating exchange rate regimes are more prone to experiencing 
currency crises. 
Moreover, we also analyze the role of capital control policies on the shocks. As a famous 
macroeconomic policy trilemma suggests, the monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and capital 
controls are the three main international macroeconomic policy tools to manage international 
financial crises, but each of these policies is constrained by the other remaining policies.
1
 In 
essence, capital controls can diminish the negative feedback effects resulting from volatile 
speculative capital. Erten and Ocampo (2017) found that capital account restrictions reduce 
foreign exchange pressure and contribute to greater macroeconomic stability; in particular, 
increasing the restrictiveness of capital controls in the run-up to the crisis moderates the growth 
decline, thus enhancing the crisis resilience. In other words, rapid financial and capital account 
liberalization without regulatory institutions and a safety net exposes countries to the risks of a 
crisis, as suggested by Stiglitz (1999). In the context of the currency crises model, Ozkan and 
Sutherland (1995) and Agénor et al. (1992) theoretically demonstrated that capital controls (or 
Tobin tax) can defer the occurrence of currency crises.
2
 In our empirical setting, we study the role 
of capital controls to mitigate the effects of shocks that lead to currency crises, and we discuss our 
results from the perspective of the policy trilemma. Thus, the third question of this paper is, “Do 
capital control policies have different effects on different types of shocks that trigger currency 
                                                   
1
 See discussion on the trilemma by Obstfeld et al. (2017). 
2
 See De Grauwe (2000) for further discussions on Tobin tax and capital controls. 
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crises?” In summary, we diagnose currency crises from the viewpoint of shocks and their 
relationship with exchange rates and capital control policies. 
The organizational structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we review the 
literature on three generations of currency crisis models and the empirical literature on the 
probability of currency crises. Then, we explain our empirical methodology and data and present 
our baseline empirical results. We further demonstrate robustness checks to support our main 
results and investigate the relationships among different shocks, exchange rate regimes and capital 
controls. Finally, we conclude our results and derive policy implications and future potential 
research topics. 
 
2 Literature Review 
The theoretical currency crises models are classified into three generations.
3
 First-generation 
models analyze a fixed exchange rate regime with an expanding fiscal policy, which is monetized 
by the monetary authority (Krugman 1979). This inconsistent macroeconomic policy mix leads to 
a currency crisis, which is foreseen a priori without any shock. In second-generation models, a 
central bank has its own objective function and minimizes the loss function (Obstfeld 1996). This 
type of model incorporates the strategic interaction between a central bank and international 
investors and exhibits a self-fulfilling prophecy (Cheli and Posta 2007). In second-generation 
models, an expectational shock, such as a shift in investors’ expectations, which can be captured as 
                                                   
3
 Nakatani (2017c) recently invented a new type of balance of payments crisis model in which a commodity price 
shock causes foreign exchange shortages. 
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a risk premium shock, triggers the currency crisis. Third-generation models, which focus on 
financial friction and banking problems, include various types of models. For example, an external 
shock in the international financial markets increases a country’s risk premium, which in turn 
worsens the balance sheets of firms and leads to a currency crisis (Céspedes et al. 2004). Other 
models show that not only financial shocks but also productivity shocks can trigger currency crises 
through deteriorating balance sheets of firms (Aghion et al. 2001; Nakatani 2017a) or commercial 
banks (Nakatani 2016). Similarly, a production shock can cause a currency crisis induced by 
liquidity problems under binding international and domestic collateral constraints (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy 2001). Although we do not focus on banking crises in this paper, shocks to 
depositors’ preferences may cause simultaneous bank runs and currency crises (Chang and 
Velasco 2001). Finally, the introduction of governments’ and/or international financial institutions’ 
implicit or explicit guarantees on lending can cause an over-borrowing syndrome and a moral 
hazard problem that results in currency crises (McKinnon and Pill 1997; Dooley 2000; Dekle and 
Kletzer 2002; Schneider and Tornell 2004). 
As we can see from the literature cited above, major shocks encompassed by various theories 
include productivity (or production) shocks and shocks in the financial markets (e.g., Aghion et al. 
2001; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001; Nakatani 2016, 2017a).
4
 The currency crisis model 
developed by Nakatani (2016, 2017a) is the most suitable model for this analysis because it can 
                                                   
4
 Among these theories, it is nearly impossible to consider government guarantees to be a triggering shock that 
results in a currency crisis because it always takes several years for the over-borrowing syndrome to result in the 
crisis. 
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analyze several types of shocks and includes features of all three generational types of currency 
crisis models. Furthermore, this model allows us to analyze both fixed and flexible exchange rate 
regimes. For these reasons, we use the model developed by Nakatani (2016, 2017a) to empirically 
analyze the effects of productivity shocks and financial shocks, i.e., shocks to a country’s risk 
premium.
5
 In other words, most of our explanatory variables are derived from a specific type of 
theoretical model (Nakatani 2016, 2017a); hence, the specification of the model that we estimate is 
based on strong theoretical underpinnings. 
The probability of a currency crisis has been analyzed in the empirical literature. Studies have 
used a probit model to estimate the probability of currency crises or currency crashes (Eichengreen 
et al. 1996: Frankel and Rose 1996; Berg and Pattillo 1999; Kruger et al. 2000; Komulainen and 
Lukkarila 2003; Frankel 2005; Licchetta 2011; Furceri et al. 2012; Zhao et al. 2014).
6
 Before 
examining the empirical literature, it is worth distinguishing between “currency crises” and 
“currency crashes” because these are two different concepts that are frequently confused. A 
currency crash is defined when the nominal exchange rate depreciates by a certain threshold (e.g., 
by 15%). This is the case when a country experiences high inflation or when a successful 
speculative attack occurs. By contrast, a currency crisis is a situation in which a country faces a 
balance of payment crisis either because of a large loss of foreign reserves and/or a large currency 
                                                   
5
 Another way to analyze the effects of shocks on the economy is to use a simulation method. For example, using 
a simulated dynamic general equilibrium model, Robert (2005) showed that both an interest rate shock and a 
productivity shock were causes of the Korean crisis. 
6
 Although some studies use a logit model, the interpretation of the results is not straightforward, as this is not a 
probability of crises (Kumar et al. 2002). 
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depreciation. In other words, currency crises include cases of both successful and unsuccessful 
speculative attacks on a domestic currency. Therefore, we can think of currency crashes as a subset 
of currency crises. 
Some studies have analyzed currency crashes. Using panel data from 20 industrial countries, 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) included a dummy variable for a currency crash in foreign countries in 
the probit model, finding evidence of contagion. Frankel and Rose (1996) used data with a broader 
coverage of sample countries and found that higher debt and lower international reserves relative 
to imports are associated with a higher probability of currency crashes. Frankel (2005) also found 
that higher import coverage of international reserves is associated with a lower probability of 
currency crashes. Moreover, according to the probit estimation results presented by Furceri et al. 
(2012), international reserves and short-term interest rates are relevant for the probability of 
currency crashes. Zhao et al. (2014) found that real exchange rate overvaluation and international 
reserves are important determinants of currency crashes for fixed exchange rate regimes, whereas 
credit growth is important for floating regimes. 
On the other hand, empirical studies on currency crises have found the following evidence. 
Using data for 20 developing countries, Kruger et al. (2000) found that real exchange rate 
overvaluation and a dummy variable for a currency crisis in a foreign country had statistically 
significant effects on the probability of currency crises. Analyzing the data on 31 emerging market 
countries, Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) found that the foreign debt of private companies and 
banks provides a good explanation of currency crises. Licchetta (2011) found that the debt-to-GDP 
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ratio, real exchange rate overvaluation, and real GDP growth have an influence on the probability 
of currency crises. 
However, none of these empirical studies have analyzed the effects of shocks on the 
probability of currency crises based on a specific theoretical model or their relationship with 
exchange rate regimes and capital account restrictions. Thus, this is the first article to analyze the 
effects of shocks on the probability of currency crises and their relationship with exchange rate and 
capital control regimes. 
 
3 Methodology and Data 
This paper uses the model developed by Nakatani (2016, 2017a) to analyze the effects of 
country risk premium shocks and productivity shocks on the probability of currency crises. The 
model shows that the nominal exchange rate and output are determined by the intersection of two 
curves, the Wealth curve and the IPLM curve, which are depicted in two dimensions, i.e., output 
on the horizontal axis and the nominal exchange rate on the vertical axis. The Wealth curve is 
characterized by the behavior of firms and is downward sloping and concave. The model predicts 
that if there is a negative productivity shock, the Wealth curve shifts to the left, which causes the 
possibility of currency crisis equilibrium. A relevant economic intuition is that the unanticipated 
negative productivity shock reduces output, profits, retained earnings, net worth and the 
investment of firms, thus resulting in extremely lower output and a corresponding lower need for 
money (i.e., depreciation of domestic currency) in the next period. By contrast, the IPLM curve is 
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characterized by a central bank’s behavior and money market equilibrium; it is also downward 
sloping but is convex. If there is a positive country risk premium shock, the IPLM curve shifts 
upward, which also generates the possibility of currency crisis equilibrium. Economic intuition 
holds that an abrupt deterioration in investors’ perceptions about a country’s gross foreign debt can 
lead to an increase in the country’s risk premium, which in turn induces depreciation of the 
national currency because of the interest parity condition. Thus, in our empirical analysis, the main 
explanatory variables are these two shocks, i.e., the productivity shock (W-shock) and the shock to 
the country’s risk premium (IPLM-shock). Although we do not analyze contagion in this paper, it 
is well noted that a contagion effect is captured in the IPLM-shock. In addition to these two shocks, 
we also include the interest rate policy variable in the explanatory variables because this may also 
affect the possibility of currency crisis equilibrium. Furthermore, following the empirical literature, 
we also include four control variables: exchange rate overvaluation, deviation of GDP growth, the 
ratio of short-term external debt to GDP, and international reserves to imports. Although the key 
feature of the model developed by Nakatani (2016, 2017a) is foreign (currency) debt and although 
this model can also include key factors of the first-generation model (level of international 
reserves) and second-generation model (overvaluation of exchange rates), these variables are 
neither triggering factors nor shocks in this theoretical model. Moreover, the purpose of this paper 
is to perform an econometrical analysis to capture the effects of shocks on the probability of a 
currency crisis based on the specific theoretical currency crisis model rather than to look for 
underlying factors that can lead to currency crises by including as many explanatory variables as 
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possible, which has been characteristic of the existing empirical literature.
7
 The regression 
equation to determine the relationship between several shocks and the probability of a currency 
crisis is defined as follows: 
      xxy 1Pr , 
where Pr  is probability, y  is a dummy variable that is unity if a currency crisis occurs and 
zero if not, x  is the set of independent variables mentioned above,   is the normal 
cumulative distribution,   is a vector of maximum likelihood estimate, and   is an error term. 
Currency crises dates are determined by the Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI), defined as 
a weighted average of monthly percent real effective exchange rate depreciation and monthly 
percent international reserve losses with weights such that the two components equal the sample 
volatility, with a 24-month window to avoid capturing the same crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
1999). Both monthly series are taken from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s International 
Financial Statistics.
8
 Here, we examine two different criteria for defining a currency crisis. A 
“standard currency crisis” year is defined when EMPI exceeds the mean plus two 
country-specific standard deviations, whereas a “severe currency crisis” year is defined when 
EMPI exceeds the mean plus three country-specific standard deviations. We study whether the 
results differ across different definitions of currency crises. 
                                                   
7
 This primarily relates to Early Warning Indicators (e.g., Salvatore 1999; Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten 2004; 
Beckman et al. 2006). 
8
 If a monthly real exchange rate variable is missing in this database, the data are taken from the Bank for 
International Settlements’ monthly real exchange rates. 
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The sample in this study covers 34 countries from 1980 to 2011 (Appendix).
9
 The detailed 
construction and sources of the data and summary statistics for each variable used in this analysis 
are presented in Nakatani (2017b). 
 
4 Baseline Estimation Results 
We are interested in the effects of real and financial shocks on the probability of a currency 
crisis. In the theoretical model, two types of shocks can trigger currency crises. One is a shock to a 
country’s risk premium, which is displayed as the IPLM-shock in this model and in the table. The 
other type of shock is a productivity shock, which is referred to as the W-shock. According to the 
baseline estimation results shown in Table 1, both types of shocks are found to be statistically 
significant at the 5% level for standard currency crises. The signs of coefficients on both variables 
are consistent with the theory by Nakatani (2016, 2017a). Specifically, an increase in the country’s 
risk premium is associated with a higher probability of a currency crisis, whereas a negative 
productivity shock is also associated with a higher probability of a crisis. By contrast, the results 
presented in the second column of Table 1 suggest that only the W-shock is statistically significant 
for severe currency crises, and the significance level increases from 5% to 1%. In other words, 
negative productivity shocks are a key triggering factor for severe currency crises. Furthermore, a 
statistically significant positive coefficient on the deviation of GDP growth implies that a severe 
                                                   
9
 Since we include both IPLM-shock and W-shock at the same time in the estimation, the number of countries is 
34. By contrast, Nakatani (2017b) used a sample of countries that had at least one type of shock; hence, the 
number of countries was 51.  
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crisis is likely to occur when the economy is booming. Combining these results, we can interpret 
the main findings as follows. If an economy is deviating from the trend growth rates and then 
experiences a negative productivity shock, the country is likely to experience a severe currency 
crisis. Furthermore, there is weak evidence for the notion that a country can avoid such a severe 
crisis if it has enough import coverage of international reserves (i.e., the coefficient on the ratio of 
reserves to imports is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level). Other control 
variables in the table are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 1: Results of Baseline Panel Probit Model 
Crisis Definition 
Standard Currency Crisis 
(2 std. dev. of EMPI) 
Severe Currency Crisis 
(3 std. dev. of EMPI) 
Interest Rate Policy 
0.0008 
(0.0006) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
IPLM-Shock 
0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
W-Shock 
-0.0095** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0028) 
Short-term External Debt / GDP 
-0.0041 
(0.0026) 
-0.0023 
(0.0020) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.0054 
(0.0043) 
0.0087** 
(0.0034) 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
0.0016 
(0.0017) 
0.0009 
(0.0012) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
-0.0516 
(0.0395) 
-0.0591* 
(0.0331) 
Number of Observations 551 551 
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. The significance level of the variables is indicated by *(10%), 
**(5%) and ***(1%). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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5 Robustness Checks: Exchange Rate Regimes and Capital Controls 
The sample countries and period of the data in this article include different exchange rate 
regimes because the model developed by Nakatani (2016, 2017a) can analyze both floating and 
pegged exchange rate regimes. However, in practice, the effects of shocks and interest rate policy 
may differ across exchange rate regimes as we have discussed in the introduction. In fact, several 
empirical studies have analyzed the effects of exchange rate regimes on currency crises because 
the different exchange rate regimes may have different probabilities of a currency crisis (e.g., Haile 
and Pozo 2006; Esaka 2010; Ghosh et al. 2015; Combes et al. 2016). For example, Esaka (2010) 
concluded that pegged exchange rate regimes are less prone to currency crises. This different 
probability of currency crisis across exchange rate regimes can be attributed to the different effects 
of shocks across exchange rate regimes. To analyze this issue, we use a subset of the data with 
comparable exchange rate regimes. We use the following two classifications that are common in 
the literature. The first is the de facto exchange rate regime classification by Ilzetzki et al. (2017). 
The second is the de jure exchange rate regime classification by the IMF. We classify exchange 
rate regimes into two general categories: floating and pegged regimes (and not into intermediate 
regimes because we are not aiming to analyze bipolar views in this paper). Following Klein and 
Shambaugh (2008), pegged regimes include currency board, conventional peg and stabilized 
arrangement; the others are floating exchange rate regimes. For the de jure classification, as most 
of the data are de jure floating exchange rate regimes, the results shown exclude de jure pegged 
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regimes. 
Table 2 presents the results based on the de facto exchange rate regime classification. The 
results for de facto floating regimes are as follows. First, we see that both IPLM-shock and 
W-shock affect the probability of a standard currency crisis, but only W-shock is statistically 
significant for a severe currency crisis in de facto floating regimes. This observation, that both real 
and financial shocks trigger currency crises, is consistent with the Nakatani (2016, 2017a) model 
and agrees with our baseline regression results, although the coefficients on W-shock are 
somewhat larger than those in the baseline. Thus, if a country has a de facto floating exchange rate 
regime, the triggering effect of the shock becomes somewhat larger. Additionally, our finding that 
the W-shock is a cause of severe currency crisis for de facto floating regimes agrees with the 
baseline estimation. In addition to these shocks, the overvaluation of exchange rates is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for both definitions of currency crises in de facto floating regimes. The 
sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on the deviation of GDP growth is close to the 
results in Table 1. By contrast, in de facto pegged regimes, only the W-shock is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for severe currency crises. Interestingly, an interest rate hike is 
associated with a higher probability of currency crisis for both definitions of currency crises in de 
facto pegged regimes. A possible interpretation of this result is that if raising interest rates is 
believed to signal weak fundamentals or panic at the monetary authorities, then it will evoke more 
speculative attacks and lead to a currency crisis (Drazen 2003). In fact, the sign of the coefficients 
on the exchange rate overvaluation supports this view. In other words, in de facto pegged regimes, 
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the monetary authority raises the interest rate, which can be perceived as a bad signal for investors 
and can lead to large currency depreciation (and/or loss of reserves). Pegged regimes can be 
successful only if they are supported by the credible commitment of monetary (and fiscal) policy 
in combination with a strong financial system (Mussa 1999). 
 
Table 2: Results Based on De Facto Exchange Rate Regime 
Exchange Rate Regime De Facto Floating De Facto Floating De Facto Pegged De Facto Pegged 
Crisis Definition 
Standard Currency 
Crisis 
(2 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Severe Currency Crisis 
(3 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Standard Currency 
Crisis 
(2 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Severe Currency Crisis 
(3 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Interest Rate Policy 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.0006 
(0.0004) 
0.0205** 
(0.0101) 
0.0198** 
(0.0080) 
IPLM-Shock 
0.0008** 
(0.0004) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0017) 
0.0004 
(0.0010) 
W-Shock 
-0.0134** 
(0.0051) 
-0.0121*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0081 
(0.0054) 
-0.0094** 
(0.0044) 
Short-term External Debt / GDP 
-0.0048 
(0.0041) 
-0.0024 
(0.0030) 
-0.0010 
(0.0030) 
0.0003 
(0.0021) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.0066 
(0.0057) 
0.0079* 
(0.0042) 
0.0051 
(0.0056) 
0.0097** 
(0.0047) 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
0.0054** 
(0.0025) 
0.0044** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0060** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0072*** 
(0.0027) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
-0.0434 
(0.0502) 
-0.0745 
(0.0464) 
-0.0571 
(0.0590) 
-0.0222 
(0.0393) 
Number of Observations 350 350 201 201 
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. The significance level of the variables is indicated by *(10%), 
**(5%) and ***(1%). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
We also found an interesting comparison between floating and pegged exchange rate regimes. 
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If we compare the coefficients on IPLM-shock and W-shock between the de facto floating and 
pegged regimes for the same definition of a currency crisis, the coefficients are always larger for 
floating regimes. This implies that the floating exchange rate regimes are more vulnerable to 
shocks that trigger currency crises. This can potentially explain why some empirical studies have 
found that countries that adopt floating exchange rate regimes are more prone to currency crises. 
 
Table 3: Results Based on De Jure Exchange Rate Regime 
Exchange Rate Regime De Jure Floating De Jure Floating 
Crisis Definition 
Standard Currency Crisis 
(2 std. dev. of EMPI) 
Severe Currency Crisis 
(3 std. dev. of EMPI) 
Interest Rate Policy 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.0006* 
(0.0004) 
IPLM-Shock 
0.0008** 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
W-Shock 
-0.0098** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0091*** 
(0.0029) 
Short-term External Debt / GDP 
-0.0045 
(0.0028) 
-0.0022 
(0.0018) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.0058 
(0.0044) 
0.0086** 
(0.0035) 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
0.0025 
(0.0018) 
0.0017 
(0.0013) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
-0.0463 
(0.0376) 
-0.0468 
(0.0312) 
Number of Observations 518 518 
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. The significance level of the variables is indicated by *(10%), 
**(5%) and ***(1%). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Furthermore, we also present the results based on de jure exchange rate regimes in Table 3. 
Note that most of our samples are de jure floating regimes; hence, we can only show the results for 
this category. We found that the results are almost the same as the baseline regression presented in 
Table 1, and we can therefore conclude that our empirical results are robust to de jure floating 
exchange rate regimes. In summary, both IPLM-shock and W-shock can cause currency crises, 
while W-shock is an important trigger for severe currency crises for de jure floating exchange rate 
regimes. 
Finally, we further analyze the roles of capital controls in the presence of shocks because the 
famous international macroeconomic policy trilemma suggests that capital account restrictions 
also influence the economic system, in addition to exchange rate policies and monetary policies. In 
Table 4, we show the results, including the interaction term of each shock and the capital control 
dummy constructed by Nakatani (2017b). The results indicate that in the presence of capital 
controls, countries in de facto floating exchange rate regimes tend to have a higher probability of a 
severe currency crisis when they experience an IPLM-shock. This result is consistent with Esaka 
(2010, 2013), who found that floating exchange rate regimes significantly increase the probability 
of currency crisis compared with pegged ones under capital controls. By contrast, the coefficients 
on the interaction term of the W-shock and capital control are always positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level for standard currency crises and at the 10% level for severe currency 
crises in de facto pegged exchange rate regimes. This implies that capital controls can mitigate the 
effects of the W-shock on the probability of currency crises in de facto pegged exchange rate 
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regimes. This finding is consistent with the conventional view that pegged regimes under 
liberalized capital accounts increase the risk of currency crises (Radelet and Sachs 1998). The 
results for the other variables do not change substantially from those in Table 2. 
 
Table 4: Results Based on De Facto Exchange Rate Regime and Capital Control 
Exchange Rate Regime De Facto Floating De Facto Floating De Facto Pegged De Facto Pegged 
Crisis Definition 
Standard Currency 
Crisis 
(2 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Severe Currency Crisis 
(3 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Standard Currency 
Crisis 
(2 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Severe Currency Crisis 
(3 std.dev. of EMPI) 
Interest Rate Policy 
0.0007 
(0.0006) 
0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.0158* 
(0.0091) 
0.0148** 
(0.0069) 
IPLM-Shock 
0.0007** 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0023) 
0.0003 
(0.0012) 
W-Shock 
-0.0137* 
(0.0080) 
-0.0178*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0390** 
(0.0171) 
-0.0277** 
(0.0137) 
IPLM-Shock×Capital Control 
0.0022 
(0.0021) 
0.0028** 
(0.0014) 
0.0000 
(0.0063) 
0.0020 
(0.0058) 
W-Shock×Capital Control 
0.0005 
(0.0087) 
0.0079 
(0.0062) 
0.0328** 
(0.0160) 
0.0206* 
(0.0125) 
Short-term External Debt / GDP 
-0.0044 
(0.0043) 
-0.0021 
(0.0032) 
-0.0012 
(0.0027) 
0.0003 
(0.0018) 
Deviation GDP Growth 
0.0073 
(0.0059) 
0.0095** 
(0.0043) 
0.0070 
(0.0055) 
0.0102** 
(0.0049) 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation 
0.0054** 
(0.0025) 
0.0040** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0057** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0065*** 
(0.0025) 
Foreign Reserves / Imports 
-0.0465 
(0.0506) 
-0.0796* 
(0.0455) 
-0.0737 
(0.0620) 
-0.0280 
(0.0382) 
Number of Observations 350 350 196 196 
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. The significance levels of the variables are indicated by *(10%), 
**(5%) and ***(1%). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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6 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Which shock triggers a currency crisis: a productivity shock in the real sector or a country 
risk premium shock in the financial markets? Which shock leads to a more severe currency crisis? 
Does each shock have a different probability of a currency crisis if the country has a different 
exchange rate policy? Do capital control policies have different effects on different types of shocks 
that trigger currency crises? We have answered these questions empirically by using panel data 
from emerging market and developing countries and applying a probit model. It is important to 
answer these questions empirically because if different shocks have different probabilities of 
currency crises, we must consider the source of shocks when we formulate macroeconomic 
policies to prevent crises. 
Our results can be summarized by the following five key points. First, we found that both 
country risk premium shocks and productivity shocks can trigger currency crises. Second, 
productivity shocks are found to be important triggers for severe currency crises, and this result is 
robust to exchange rate regimes. These first two key results produce the following main policy 
implications; policymakers need to focus not only on the financial supervision and 
macroprudential policies to prepare a safety net against financial shocks but also on economic and 
industrial policies to avoid severe currency crises because we found that real (productivity) shocks 
trigger severe crises. For instance, as we argued in the introduction, various market regulations and 
structural reforms can influence innovations, as well as exits and entries of firms, and thereby 
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change productivity dynamics. Third, we found that the floating exchange rate regimes are more 
vulnerable to shocks that trigger currency crises. This finding is consistent with the existing 
empirical literature, which found floating exchange rate regimes are more prone to experiencing 
currency crises. Fourth, from the perspective of monetary policy formulation, our results show that 
monetary tightening in pegged exchange rate regimes can increase the probability of currency 
crises. Our interpretation of this result is that an interest rate hike can send a negative signal to 
investors by indicating weak fundamentals or panic at the monetary authority, therefore evoking 
more speculative attacks and finally leading to a currency crisis. Fifth, we also found some 
evidence that capital controls can mitigate the impacts of productivity shocks in pegged exchange 
rate regimes. Namely, if countries with pegged exchange rate regimes have capital controls, they 
can mitigate the effects of negative productivity shocks during currency crises. This is a new 
empirical finding that is not found in the existing literature. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper, a future study might investigate the mechanism for this role of capital control on 
productivity shocks. A possible interpretation is that capital controls can insulate the economy 
from volatile capital, and hence the resilience of the economy increases during the time when the 
country is hit by the shocks. Our last finding supports the conventional view that pegged exchange 
rate regimes under liberalized capital accounts increase the risk of currency crises. 
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Appendix: List of Countries 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Dominican Republic 
Gabon 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Romania 
Russia 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
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